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Abstract During recent years, mindfulness-based approaches
have been gaining relevance for treatment in clinical pop-
ulations. Correspondingly, the empirical study of mindfulness
has steadily grown; thus, the availability of valid measures of
the construct is critically important. This paper gives an over-
view of the current status in the field of self-report assessment
of mindfulness. All eight currently available and validated
mindfulness scales (for adults) are evaluated, with a particular
focus on their virtues and limitations and on differences among
them. It will be argued that none of these scales may be a fully
adequate measure of mindfulness, as each of them offers
unique advantages but also disadvantages. In particular, none
of them seems to provide a comprehensive assessment of all
aspects of mindfulness in samples from the general population.
Moreover, some scales may be particularly indicated in inves-
tigations focusing on specific populations such as clinical
samples (Cognitive and Affective Mindfulness Scale, South-
ampton Mindfulness Questionnaire) or meditators (Freiburg
Mindfulness Inventory). Three main open issues are discussed:
(1) the coverage of aspects of mindfulness in questionnaires;
(2) the nature of the relationships between these aspects; and
(3) the validity of self-report measures of mindfulness. These
issues should be considered in future developments in the self-
report assessment of mindfulness.
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Introduction
During the last decades, the empirical study of mindfulness
and the use of mindfulness techniques in clinical practice
have been steadily expanding. The efficacy of mindfulness-
oriented interventions such as Mindfulness-Based Stress
Reduction (MBSR; Kabat-Zinn 1990) and Mindfulness-
Based Cognitive Therapy (MBCT; Segal et al. 2002;
Teasdale et al. 1995) has been established (Grossman et al.
2004; Hofmann et al. 2010; Shigaki et al. 2006). Currently,
researchers increasingly concentrate on the mechanisms
through which mindfulness exerts positive influences on
mental and physical well-being (Coffey and Hartman
2008; Crane et al. 2010; Shapiro et al. 2006; Williams et
al. 2011).
A reliable and valid measurement of mindfulness is
crucial for empirical investigation, especially as research
is moving increasingly toward the study of how mind-
fulness influences health. The present article provides an
overview and discussion of the state of assessment of
mindfulness using self-reports. As reliability and validity
analyses of current scales were already extensively cov-
ered elsewhere (Baer et al. 2009; Johnson 2007), we
will focus on conceptual issues related to the content of
the available self-report measures (content validity), on
the relative strengths and disadvantages of each scale, as
well as on the interpretation of unexpected findings and
their implications for the validity of the assessment of
mindfulness. First, general issues regarding the defini-
tion and operationalization of mindfulness will be de-
scribed. We will then give a critical overview of the
currently available validated self-report measures of mind-
fulness. Finally, we will highlight implications and future
challenges for the conceptualization and operationalization
of mindfulness.
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The Search for a Consensual Definition
and Operationalization of Mindfulness
Bishop et al. (2004) offered an influential suggestion for a
consensual definition and operationalization of mindfulness.
The authors described two components of mindfulness: (1)
self-regulation of attention such that it is directed to the
present moment and (2) a particular orientation involving
curiosity, openness, and acceptance. If one considers other
definitions proposed in the scientific literature, further
aspects might be added to the second component—mindful
orientation. These aspects are: a non-judgmental, compas-
sionate and openhearted attitude, non-identification with the
experiences, insightful understanding, non-reactivity to the
experiences, a decentered stance (i.e., experiencing one’s
thoughts and feelings from a decentered perspective, with-
out overidentifying with them), and participation in the
experience (Brown and Ryan 2004; Kabat-Zinn 1994,
2003; Lau et al. 2006; Marlatt and Kristeller 1999; Robins
2002; Teasdale et al. 2002; Walach et al. 2006). Hence,
mindfulness can be conceptualized as a form of attention
characterized by a range of attributes or aspects, which are
distinct but overlapping (e.g., acceptance and non-
judgment). The breadth and complexity of mindfulness, as
well as its origins in Buddhist psychology, have significant-
ly contributed to the current plurality of definitions and
operationalizations. As a result, over the last decade, at least
eight mindfulness self-report questionnaires have been de-
veloped and are now employed in psychological research:
The Freiburg Mindfulness Inventory (FMI; Buchheld et al.
2001; Walach et al. 2006), the Mindful Attention Awareness
Scale (MAAS; Brown and Ryan 2003), the Cognitive and
Affective Mindfulness Scale-Revised (CAMS-R; Feldman et
al. 2007; Hayes and Feldman 2004), the Southampton Mind-
fulness Questionnaire (SMQ; Chadwick et al. 2008), the
Kentucky Inventory of Mindfulness Scale (KIMS; Baer et
al. 2004), the Five Facet Mindfulness Questionnaire
(FFMQ; Baer et al. 2006), the Philadelphia Mindfulness
Scale (PHLMS; Cardaciotto et al. 2008), and the Toronto
Mindfulness Scale (TMS; Lau et al. 2006).
The availability of a variety of measures of mindfulness
can be beneficial for research. For instance, the TMS spe-
cifically assesses the capacity to invoke a mindfulness state
during meditation practice, whereas at least seven scales
(FMI, MAAS, CAMS-R, SMQ, KIMS, FFMQ, and
PHLMS) were designed to measure trait mindfulness. The
theoretical and operational distinction between state and
trait mindfulness is appropriate, as both are closely related
but different constructs (Thompson and Waltz 2007). In fact,
studies suggest that there is little or no relationship between
the mindfulness state during meditation (TMS) and everyday
trait mindfulness (FFMQ, CAMS-R, andMAAS; Carmody, et
al. 2008; Thompson and Waltz 2007). It is thus advisable to
have at one’s disposal distinct questionnaires capturing either
trait or state mindfulness.
Current mindfulness scales differ with respect to funda-
mental aspects of the mindfulness construct. While most
scales include a focus on attention or awareness, compar-
isons also reveal substantial deviations. For instance, the
MAAS (Brown and Ryan 2003) measures mindfulness rath-
er narrowly focusing on the attention component. The
KIMS and the FMI measure mindfulness as a multifaceted
construct. However, the facets are distinct in the KIMS
(Baer et al. 2004) but overlap in the FMI and cannot be
clearly distinguished through factor analysis (Leigh et al.
2005; Walach et al. 2006). Accordingly, correlations of
mindfulness measurements between MAAS, CAMS, FMI,
KIMS, and PHLMS were found to range from .21 to .67
(Baer et al. 2006; Cardaciotto et al. 2008). This heterogene-
ity in the self-report assessments of mindfulness evidently
constitutes a problem for comparing and replicating research
findings. According to a recent study, current mindfulness
scales include nine distinguishable aspects of mindfulness,
whereas each scale comprises a different subset of these
aspects and none includes all (Table 1) (Bergomi et al.
2012). The nine aspects were theoretically derived based on
a review of eight questionnaires, the subscales they include,
and the theoretical constructs their conceptualization is based
upon. All aspects of mindfulness included in the scales were
listed and semantically grouped, taking into consideration the
scale descriptions and the content of items. The resulting
aspects are (1) observing, attending to experiences; (2) acting
with awareness; (3) non-judgment, acceptance of experiences;
(4) self-acceptance; (5) willingness and readiness to expose
oneself to experiences, non-avoidance; (6) non-reactivity to
experience; (7) non-identification with own experiences; (8)
insightful understanding; and (9) labeling, describing.
The subsequent section will provide an overview of the
existing validated mindfulness scales (for adults), of their
strengths and limitations as well as of relevant research
findings. Particular attention will be paid to the conceptual-
ization of mindfulness underlying the scales and their suit-
ability for assessing mindfulness in the general population.
All scales presented in the following show satisfactory to
good internal consistency; several studies have supported
their convergent, discriminant, and known-groups validity
(Baer et al. 2009; Johnson 2007). Evidence for their predic-
tive validity is nevertheless still scarce and, to our knowl-
edge, limited to the MAAS: in one study, post-treatment
MAAS scores predicted the risk of relapse/recurrence to
major depressive disorder during 12 months after an MBCT
intervention (Michalak et al. 2008). Moreover, scores of
mindfulness questionnaires show inconsistent patterns of
relationship with practice in meditators. Studies provided
evidence for positive associations of meditation practice
with MAAS, KIMS, FMI, FFMQ, and TMS (Baer et al.
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2004, 2006, 2008; Brown and Ryan 2003; Walach et al.
2006) as well as for the absence of such relationships with
MAAS, FFMQ, CAMS, MQ, and TMS (Baer et al. 2006,
2008; Carmody et al. 2008; Lau et al. 2006; MacKillop and
Anderson 2007). It is not the primary focus of the present
overview to systematically reinvestigate this psychometric
evidence. Issues relating to the validity of the scales will be
addressed insofar as they may contribute to guide the con-
struction of further mindfulness scales.
This overview will start with two questionnaires, the FMI
and the TMQ, which require respondents have some medi-
tation experience. The remaining questionnaires, which
Table 1 Aspects of mindfulness in eight current mindfulness questionnaires
Aspect of mindfulness (item example) Questionnaire (subscale or construct)
Observing, attending to experiences (PHLMS 09: “When I walk outside,
I am aware of smells or how the air feels against my face.”)
CAMS (awareness)
FMI (mindful presence, Walach et al. 2006; FMI (mind/body awareness,
Leigh et al. 2005)
KIMS (observing)
FFMQ (observe)
PHLMS (awareness)
Acting with awareness (MAAS 10: “I do jobs or tasks automatically,
without being aware of what I'm doing.”)
MAAS (presence)
KIMS (acting with awareness)
FFMQ (actaware)
FMI (concentration, Bergomi 2007)
CAMS (attention and present-focus)
Non-judgment, acceptance of experiences (KIMS 04: “I criticize myself
for having irrational or inappropriate emotions.”)
KIMS (accepting without judgment)
FFMQ (nonjudge)
SMQ (accepting difficult thoughts/images and oneself versus judging
cognitions and self)
CAMS (acceptance)
Self-acceptance (FMI 19: “I accept myself as I am.”) FMI (non-judgmental acceptance, Walach et al. 2006; acceptance and
openness to self and experience in Leigh et al. 2005; self-acceptance,
in Bergomi 2007)
SMQ (accepting difficult thoughts/images and oneself versus judging
cognitions and self)
Willingness and readiness to expose oneself to experiences, non-
avoidance (PHLMS 06: “I try to stay busy to keep thoughts or feelings
from coming to mind.”)
PHLMS (acceptance)
FMI (openness to experience, Walach et al. 2006; non-avoidant aware-
ness, Bergomi 2007)
SMQ (allowing attention to remain with difficult cognitions versus
experiential avoidance)
TMS (curiosity)
CAMS (acceptance)
Non-reactivity to experience (SMQ 1: “Usually when I have distressing
thoughts or images, I am able just to notice them without reacting.”)
FFMQ (nonreact)
FMI (nonreactivity to inner experience, Bergomi 2007)
SMQ (letting difficult cognitions pass without reacting versus
rumination/worry)
CAMS (acceptance)
Non-identification with own experiences (SMQ 10: “Usually when I
have distressing thoughts or images, I just notice them and let them
go.”)
TMS (decentering)
FMI (mindful presence, Walach et al. 2006; non-attachment to thoughts,
Leigh et al. 2005)
SMQ (decentered awareness).
Insightful understanding (FMI 16: “I see how I create my own
suffering.”)
FMI (insight, Walach et al. 2006),
Labeling, describing (KIMS 2: “I’m good at finding the words to
describe my feelings.”)
KIMS (describing)
FFMQ (describe)
The nine aspects proposed here were theoretically derived on the basis of a review of current mindfulness scales. The FMI showed an unstable
factor solution over different studies. This overview comprises all subscales of the FMI derived in three different studies in which the scale was
subjected to principal component analysis: Walach et al. 2006; Leigh et al. 2005; Bergomi 2007
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should allowmeasurement ofmindfulness in individuals with-
out meditation experience, will be reviewed in an order con-
venient for the logic of the argumentation in the overview.
Overview of Available Mindfulness Scales
The Freiburg Mindfulness Inventory
The construction of the FMI (Buchheld et al. 2001; Walach
et al. 2006) was particularly inspired by the Buddhist roots
of the construct. Items construction and selection were
based on an extensive review of mindfulness and insight
meditation literature, interviews with experts (i.e., mindful-
ness meditation teachers and long-time meditators), and
finally, on validation analysis in a sample of Buddhist med-
itators. The final scale contains 30 items. The four-factor
structure found in the validation study (mindful presence,
non-judgmental acceptance, openness to experiences, and
insight) was found to be unstable (Walach et al. 2006).
Correspondingly, in two studies principal component anal-
yses yielded a three-factor (Leigh et al. 2005) and a four-
factor (Bergomi 2007) structure differing from the structure
of the FMI validation study, thus reflecting the richness of
aspects of mindfulness captured by this scale. In the FMI,
mindfulness comprises facets that cannot be clearly disen-
tangled. Further statistical analyses led to a short, putatively
one-dimensional 14-item version of the FMI that should be
more appropriate for use in the general population (Walach
et al. 2006). In two studies, the 14-item version was found to
be two-dimensional, comprising a presence factor (FMI 7:
“I feel connected to my experience in the here-and-now.”)
and an acceptance factor (FMI 9:“I am friendly to myself
when things go wrong.”), with the number of items of each
subscale differing between studies (Kohls et al. 2009;
Ströhle 2006). A recent qualitative analysis of the German
(i.e., original) 14-item FMI showed that individuals without
meditation experience systematically misunderstood items 1
(“I am open to the experience of the present moment”), 2 (“I
sense my body, whether eating, cooking, cleaning or talk-
ing.”), 3 (“When I notice an absence of mind, I gently return
to the experience of the here and now.”), and 7 (see above)
(Belzer et al. 2011). The authors recommended reformulat-
ing these items.
In summary, the FMI in its current (short and long)
versions seems inappropriate in populations unfamiliar with
mindfulness or Buddhist concepts, since at least some items
may be systematically misunderstood by individuals with-
out meditation experience. Nevertheless, the FMI may be
particularly suited for addressing aspects of mindfulness that
are relevant to experienced meditators, and its use is encour-
aged in populations familiar with meditation. As the scale
comprises more “advanced” items, it may better differentiate
among meditators. The unstable factor structure of the FMI
does not allow the measurement of distinct facets of the
mindfulness construct. This is an important limitation for the
analysis of the differential contributions of each aspect of
mindfulness and of their association with other constructs
(Smith et al. 2003; Smith and McCarthy 1995). However,
the lack of a clear-cut structure found in the FMI is possibly
less an indication of weakness of the scale rather than an
inherent aspect of mindfulness itself. This issue will be dis-
cussed further.
The Toronto Mindfulness Scale
The TMS was developed by Lau et al. (2006) as a measure
of the mindful state. The scale addresses a person's experi-
ences during an immediately preceding meditation session.
The TMS comprises two factors, curiosity (TMS 17: “I was
curious about my reactions to things”) and decentering
(TMS 33: “I was more concerned with being open to my
experiences than controlling or changing them”). A trait
version of the TMS was developed and preliminarily vali-
dated in meditators and nonmeditators (Davis et al. 2009).
Both trait decentering and trait curiosity were positively
associated with other trait mindfulness scales, with correla-
tions higher for trait decentering. The trait decentering
scores were higher in participants with longer meditation
experience. Similarly, in the validation study of the state
version of the TMS, state decentering was generally higher
in meditators with more meditation experience, whereas
state curiosity was increased only in a subgroup of medi-
tators trained in mindfulness meditation as described in
MBSR, yet not in the Shambhala subgroup. These results
suggest that the curiosity subscale of the TMS may be
specific to particular conceptualizations of mindfulness.
The Shambhala Buddhist tradition emphasizes the redirec-
tion of attention to the meditation object rather than the
observation and investigation of distracting experiences (as
is emphasized in the non-secular practice of MBSR), which
may explain the reported lack of effect of this practice on
curiosity (Lau et al. 2006). Moreover, the Shambhala tradi-
tion focuses on existing in the world as a “warrior” who is
seeking enlightenment out of compassion for all sentient
beings (Rinpoche 2005). In contrast, all curiosity items
of the TMS are directed towards oneself (TMS 32: “I
was curious about what I might learn about myself by
taking notice of how I react to certain thoughts, feelings
or sensations.”).
In sum, the TMS measures two aspects of mindfulness:
decentering and curiosity. Thus the TMS has the advantage
of explicitly assessing the decentered stance to experiences
which, as a central aspect of mindful attention (Teasdale et
al. 2002), is clearly underrepresented among current mind-
fulness scales. Moreover, the TMS is the only current
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mindfulness scale assessing state mindfulness. The TMS
seems to focus on the second component of mindfulness
(mindful orientation) proposed by Bishop et al. (2004),
whereas self-regulation of attention is not explicitly mea-
sured by this scale. Results from meditator subgroups sug-
gest that the curiosity subscale of the TMS may be more
related to specific conceptualizations of mindfulness, for
example mindfulness as taught in MBSR, rather than to a
more general mindfulness construct.
The Philadelphia Mindfulness Scale
The Philadelphia Mindfulness Scale (PHLMS; Cardaciotto
et al. 2008) is a 20-item questionnaire comprising two sub-
scales: awareness and acceptance. The awareness subscale
assesses noticing and being aware of thoughts, feelings,
perceptions, and body sensations (PHLMS 3: “When talking
with other people, I am aware of their facial and body
expressions.”) while the acceptance subscale is focused on
the assessment of experiential avoidance (PHLMS 12:
“There are things I try not to think about.”). The scale is
theoretically well-founded, predominantly based on defini-
tions of mindfulness proposed by Kabat-Zinn (1994) and
Bishop et al. (2004). Unfortunately, the two components of
the PHLMS are conceptualized rather narrowly. The aware-
ness subscale comprises open awareness of perceptions,
sensations, and feelings and omits the acting with awareness
aspect that is covered, for example, in the KIMS or FFMQ
(Baer et al. 2006). Moreover, the acceptance subscale con-
tains only items that are negatively formulated and capture
experiential avoidance while positive acceptance, a compas-
sionate stance towards oneself, non-reactivity and non-
judgment are excluded.
The Mindful Attention Awareness Scale
The MAAS (Brown and Ryan 2003) is a 15-item scale
measuring mindfulness as a single factor relating to attention.
The one-dimensional structure of the MAAS was replicated
in several studies (Carlson and Brown 2005; MacKillop
and Anderson 2007). Originally, the MAAS comprised a pres-
ence and an acceptance factor. The acceptance factor was
excluded in the final version because it did not provide an
“explanatory advantage over that shown by the presence
factor alone” (Brown and Ryan 2004, p. 244). The authors
concluded that the acceptance of the present moment is
already embedded within the capacity for sustained attention
and thus “as a distinct construct, acceptance is functionally
redundant in mindfulness” (Brown and Ryan 2004, p. 245).
This conclusion, however, is challenged by results obtained
with the PHLMS, which comprises both awareness and
acceptance subscales. The associations reported in the
validation study of the PHLMS suggest an explanatory
advantage of the acceptance factor over the awareness fac-
tor, as the former was markedly associated with indicators of
well-being that were uncorrelated to awareness. Similarly,
using the 14-item FMI, Kohls et al. (2009) claimed that the
negative relationship between mindfulness and anxiety and
depression may be “completely due to the ‘Acceptance’
factor of mindfulness” (p. 224).
One important difference between the MAAS and both
PHLMS and FMI is that the awareness items in the PHLMS
and the 14-item FMI are all in the positive form, whereas in
the MAAS items are all negatively formulated (MAAS 7: “It
seems I am ‘running on automatic’ without much awareness
of what I’m doing.”). Some authors have described the
MAAS as a measure of “being seriously, spaced out” (Rosch
2007, p. 262–263), an agitated lack of attentiveness
(Grossman 2008), everyday attention lapses (Carriere et al.
2008), or automatic pilot and its effects (Williams 2010).
The negative formulation of the MAAS may implicitly
measure a judgmental and critical stance towards oneself.
This assumption is supported by several findings. First, the
MAAS has a higher correlation with the acceptance subscale
than with the subscale capturing an open observing stance of
the PHLMS (r0.32 vs. .21, p<.001; Cardaciotto et al. 2008)
and of the KIMS (r0.41 vs. .18, p<.01; Höfling et al. 2011).
Second, in the validation study of the Child and Adolescent
Mindfulness Measure (CAMM; Greco et al. 2011), items
reflecting (1) noticing or attending to internal phenomena;
(2) lack of awareness of ongoing activities (i.e., similar to
the presence items of the MAAS); and (3) a judgmental,
non-accepting stance towards thoughts and feelings were
subjected to exploratory factor analysis. In the resulting
two-factor solution of the CAMM, the MAAS-similar items
and those capturing a judgmental stance loaded on the same
factor, supporting semantic relatedness. In other words, the
presence factor of the MAAS may include an acceptance
aspect and thus an additional acceptance factor loses explan-
atory power. This appears to be a result of the specific
formulation of the presence items in the MAAS.
In summary, the MAAS allows a concise assessment of
mindfulness in populations without previous meditation ex-
perience. This scale appears to address both the attention
and the acceptance aspects of mindfulness, yet does not
differentiate one aspect from the other. Moreover, measuring
mindfulness “negatively”may not reflect the complete spec-
trum of mindfulness experiences.
The Cognitive and Affective Mindfulness Scale-Revised
The CAMS-R (Feldman et al. 2007; Hayes and Feldman
2004) is a 12-item scale of mindfulness in general daily
experience. The scale was designed to address attention,
present-focus, awareness, and acceptance/non-judgment of
thoughts and feelings, which all converge in a single total
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mindfulness score. The scale differs in an interesting way
from most other mindfulness scales: most items capture
a capacity and willingness to be mindful (CAMS-R 9:
“I try to notice my thoughts without judging them”;
CAMS-R 1: “It is easy for me to concentrate on what I
am doing”) rather than the extent to which an individual
is being mindful throughout the day. Moreover, in devel-
oping the CAMS, the authors' intention was to measure “a
kind of mindfulness that … could be useful in the treat-
ment of depression” (Hayes and Feldman 2004, p. 260).
Correspondingly, the present-focus items of the CAMS in-
volve a tendency to preoccupation or worrying (CAMS-R 2:
“I am preoccupied by the future”). In two studies, the CAMS-
R (resp. the CAMS) was more related to measures of psycho-
logical distress (e.g., psychological symptoms, neuroticism,
and difficulties in emotion regulation) than the MAAS,
FMI, KIMS, and SMQ (Baer et al. 2006; Thompson
and Waltz 2007). In sum, the CAMS-R offers a short
instrument that still captures different aspects of mindfulness.
Mindfulness as measured by the CAMS-R is unique in two
ways: (1) it is understood as the willingness and ability to be
mindful rather than as a realization of mindfulness experience
during the day, and (2) it is particularly related to psycholog-
ical distress. As a consequence, the CAMS-R may be of
particular use in clinical studies.
The Southampton Mindfulness Questionnaire
The Southampton Mindfulness Questionnaire (SMQ;
Chadwick et al. 2008; first introduced as Mindfulness Ques-
tionnaire, MQ, Chadwick et al. 2005, unpublished manu-
script, cited in Baer et al. 2006) is a 16-item scale with four
related bipolar aspects of a mindful approach to distressing
thoughts and images. All items begin with, “Usually, when I
have distressing thoughts or images” and continue with a
mindfulness-related response (SMQ 1: “I am able to just
notice them without reacting.”; SMQ 12: “In my mind I try
to push them away”). The four bipolar aspects assessed by the
SMQ are (1) decentered awareness vs. being lost in reacting to
cognitions; (2) allowing attention to stay in contact with
difficult cognitions vs. experiential avoidance; (3) acceptance
of difficult thoughts and images and of oneself vs. being
judgmental; and (4) letting go of and being non-reactive to
difficult cognitions vs. rumination or worry. Exploratory fac-
tor analyses, however, suggested a one-dimensional factor
structure of the scale (Chadwick et al. 2005, 2008). The
SMQ specifically assesses how (mindfully) one relates to
“distressing thoughts and images, which are important phe-
nomena in all mental health problems and the cornerstone of
cognitive theory and therapy” (Chadwick et al. 2008, p. 452).
Hence, the SMQ may prove to be very useful for the investi-
gation of relationships between mental health problems and
mindful awareness. The scale appears particularly suited for
studies focusing on the effects of a mindful attitude towards
distressing inner experiences but may be too specific for more
general use, as it does not involve items relating to positive or
neutral phenomena. Moreover, individuals who are less prone
to distressing thoughts and images may have difficulties relat-
ing the SMQ items to their daily experience.
The Kentucky Inventory of Mindfulness Scale
The KIMS (Baer et al. 2004) comprises 39 items that largely
target the conceptualization of mindfulness skills as described
in Dialectical Behavioral Therapy (DBT; Linehan 1993). The
KIMSwas designed to measure four aspects of mindfulness in
daily life (observing, describing, acting with awareness, and
accepting without judgment). One aspect of mindfulness
unique to the KIMS and largely based on elements of DBT
is describing, the ability to verbally describe (or label) expe-
riences (KIMS 10: “I’m good at thinking of words to express
my perceptions, such as how things taste, smell, or sound.”).
In the mindfulness tradition, labeling of experiences is often
considered a component of mindfulness meditation, signify-
ing a general recognition that thoughts are (just) thoughts,
feelings are feelings, etc. rather than an accurate description
of feelings or of the contents of thought. In fact, mindfulness
has been described as being pre- or para-conceptual, not
involving categorization, reflection, introspection, or compar-
isons of experiences (Brown et al. 2007; Gunaratana 2002). It
is thus unclear to what extent the ability to verbally describe
experiences as measured by the KIMS constitutes a core
component of mindfulness and should accordingly be a cen-
tral facet in a mindfulness scale. In 2006, Baer et al. developed
a further self-report measure of mindfulness, the FFMQ,
which includes the four facets of the KIMS and many of its
items. As these two scales are similar and interrelated, they
will be discussed jointly in the following section.
The Five Facet Mindfulness Questionnaire
The FFMQ (Baer et al. 2006) is a 39-item multifaceted scale
covering five aspects of mindfulness: nonreactivity to inner
experience (nonreact), observing/noticing/attending to sensa-
tions/perceptions/thoughts/feelings (observe), acting with
awareness/automatic pilot/concentration/nondistraction
(actaware), describing/labeling with words (describe), and
nonjudging of experience (nonjudge). We will describe the
FFMQ in more detail, as it constitutes an important attempt to
integrate the conceptualizations and operationalizations of
five validated mindfulness questionnaires. This scale and its
facets resulted from an exploratory factor analysis of the
combined pool of 112 items collected from the KIMS, the
FMI, the MAAS, the CAMS, and the SMQ. The factor anal-
ysis produced five factors that could be replicated with con-
firmatory factor analysis (Baer et al. 2006). In a hierarchical
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model, all facets except observe (KIMS 21: “I pay attention to
sensations, such as the wind in my hair or sun on my face.”)
were shown to be aspects of an overall mindfulness construct
(in a subgroup of meditators, observe significantly loaded on
the overall mindfulness construct as well). This finding was
unexpected, since observing, i.e., directing attention at per-
ceptions and experiences, is generally recognized as the core
aspect of mindfulness. Moreover, the observe facet was unex-
pectedly positively correlated with measures of dissociation,
absentmindedness, psychological symptoms, and thought
suppression, and not associated with nonjudging of experi-
ence (Baer et al. 2006). Furthermore, the nearly identical
observe scale of the KIMS (which comprises some additional
items) was negatively associated with the accepting without
judgment KIMS scale in a college student sample (Baer et al.
2004). Similar associations with thought suppression (Greco
et al. 2011; Thompson and Waltz 2010), somatic complaints
(Greco et al. 2011), and accepting without judgment
(Vujanovic et al. 2009) were also established in further studies
using the original English versions of the FFMQ and KIMS
and in the validation study of the CAMM (an adaptation of the
KIMS for children and adolescents, from which the observing
scale was finally excluded). The authors proposed that atten-
tion to experiences might be related to a tendency towards
judging them in individuals without meditation experience,
which is not (or less so) the case for people with meditation
experience. In accordance with this, the correlation between
the FFMQ observe and the FFMQ nonjudging of experience
was positive in a subgroup with meditation experience (Baer
et al. 2006). However, other mindfulness scales do not show
similar association patterns (Bergomi 2007; Cardaciotto et al.
2008). These unexpected patterns may be more related to
the observe items of the FFMQ than to attending to
experience that is characteristic of mindfulness. Baer et
al. (2006) proposed that the unexpected results may be
due to FFMQ observe items addressing external stimuli
and bodily sensations, whereas items pertaining to other facets
are rather related to internal factors such as emotions, cogni-
tions, and functioning on “automatic pilot” (Baer et al. 2006).
However, this explanation leaves the unexpected positive
associations between observe items and measures of mental
disorders unresolved. One possible alternative explanation is
that many items of the observe facet involve aspects such as
strain and effort to pay attention (KIMS 9: “When I’m walk-
ing, I deliberately notice the sensations of my body moving.”;
KIMS 13: “When I take a shower or a bath, I stay alert to the
sensations of water on my body.”). What these items aim at
may be well understood by individuals with some degree of
meditation experience, but in the general population, endorse-
ment of such items may reflect an exaggerated tendency to
self-attention. Moreover, individuals lacking experience with
meditation may easily misinterpret and misunderstand FFMQ
items such as “I notice how foods and drinks affect my
thoughts, bodily sensations, and emotions.” (KIMS 17) (cf.
Grossman 2008).
In sum, the FFMQ is a comprehensive scale that integra-
tes the conceptualizations of mindfulness underlying five
validated mindfulness scales and measures clearly distinct
facets of mindfulness. It is thus a suitable instrument for the
assessment of differential contributions of mindfulness
aspects. Unfortunately, it also has several limitations. The
approach leading to the scale was mainly empirically (rather
than theoretically) founded. Merging all items of different
mindfulness scales produced a rather arbitrary item pool, in
which some theoretically meaningful aspects of mindfulness
are absent (e.g., willingness and readiness to expose oneself
to experiences), whereas others are over- or underrepresent-
ed. Additionally, it must be expected that those question-
naires which contributed more items to the item pool and
which had a clearer factor structure may have had a larger
impact on the results of the exploratory factor analysis. In
particular, four out of the five facets resulting from the
analysis yielded the same factor structure as the KIMS,
which was the longest scale included in the analysis and
the only one showing a clear multifaceted factor structure. It
may be a consequence of this procedure that some of the
aspects present in the five contributing questionnaires did
not appear in the final factor structure of the FFMQ. For
example, non-identification with own experiences, which is
included in the FMI and the SMQ, failed to emerge from the
factor analysis. The observe facet was positively associated
with psychopathological categories and with mental disor-
ders and, in a hierarchical model, it failed to load on an
overall (second-order) mindfulness factor (Baer et al. 2006).
It is thus unclear whether the observe items adequately
pertain to the quality of noticing, an essential characteristic
of mindfulness.
Implications for the Assessment of Mindfulness
The available questionnaires provide an interesting range of
instruments, some of which may be particularly helpful in
the investigation of specific research questions. For exam-
ple, the CAMS and the SMQ may be preferable for assess-
ments in clinical practice and research, as they focus on
clinically relevant aspects such as reactions on distressing
inner experiences. All other scales may also be applied in
clinical contexts but may be more generally useful for
research, including fields such as meditation research, cog-
nitive science, and social psychology. For example, the use
of the FMI may be encouraged in populations that are
familiar with meditation. For assessments in the general
population, the FFMQ provides the most comprehensive
coverage of aspects of mindfulness, whereas the PHLMS
offers the advantages of a short but multidimensional scale.
Mindfulness (2013) 4:191–202 197
Yet, the current situation in the self-report assessment of
mindfulness suffers from several limitations. First, each of
the validated mindfulness scales is associated with particular
advantages but also disadvantages for a comprehensive
assessment of mindfulness in the general population. Sec-
ond, substantial differences in the covered aspects of mind-
fulness hinder the comparison of results from studies using
different scales, thus impeding communication about the
construct (Brown et al. 2007; Malinowski 2008). Finally,
results from current scales point at a possible further prob-
lem: the inclusion of items that can be easily misinterpreted,
in particular, by respondents who are not familiar with the
mindfulness concept (cf. Grossman 2008).
The availability of a suitable scale, however, is essential
for research in the rapidly evolving field of mindfulness
research. New self-report instruments may therefore be
needed that are theoretically based and take into account
previous operationalizations as well as results from the em-
pirical research based on the available measures. The devel-
opment of new scales may profit from cross-validation with
constructs that are closely related to mindfulness such as non-
attachment (Sahdra et al. 2010), self-compassion (Neff 2003)
and awareness (Shields et al. 1989), as well as with mindful-
ness measures that do not rely on self-report but, for example,
on experimental tasks or interview data (Grossman 2008;
Frewen et al. 2011). The development of such measures
is attracting increasing interest (see Bishop et al. 2004;
Brown and Ryan 2003; Burg and Michalak 2010; Collins et
al. 2009; Davidson 2010; Dobkin 2008; Frewen et al. 2008;
Williams 2010).
Open Issues for Self-Report Measures
Researchers working on the further development of self-
report measures of mindfulness will have to deal with at
least three major open issues: (1) the aspects of mindfulness
to be assessed; (2) the nature of the relationships between
these aspects; and (3) the validity of mindfulness assessment
using self-report. In the following, these issues and possible
research strategies for resolving them will be described.
The issue of the coverage of the aspects of mindfulness is
related to the comprehensiveness or, conversely, the parsi-
mony (Carmody 2009) of assessments. As mentioned
above, each of the current mindfulness scales provides a
different description of the construct (Christopher et al.
2009). Conceiving of mindfulness too narrowly would en-
tail the danger of denaturizing the construct, e.g., by focus-
ing primarily on the attention component while leaving out
the attributes that distinguish mindfulness from a more
general attention construct. For operationalizations of mind-
fulness, this would correspond to a lack of content validity.
On the other hand, Rosch (2007) suggested that some of the
factors included in current mindfulness questionnaires as-
sess traits indicating reasonableness such as not being
“spaced out”, overly emotional, or self-critical. This may
imply that a more general inclusion of such aspects may lead
to “measuring a construct of more versus less pathology…or
Relative Sanity or Reasonableness” (Rosch 2007, p. 262–
263). There is no definite answer to the issue of conceptual
coverage of mindfulness because no normative mindfulness
definition exists. Despite disparities, the conceptualizations
of mindfulness behind current questionnaires also show
important similarities and overlaps pointing to an implicit
consensus among experts regarding an applicable definition
of mindfulness for scientific research. It seems reasonable
for research to pursue a flexible (but still consensual) con-
ceptualization of the construct. In our view, the use of a
more comprehensive conceptualization and operationaliza-
tion of mindfulness is preferable. Our exploratory study
based on the nine aspects of mindfulness reported in Table 1
pointed, on one side, to the relevance of non-avoidance as
an aspect of the mindfulness construct and, on the other
side, to a possibly marginal role of the capacity to put
thoughts and feelings into words (Bergomi et al. 2012). In
future studies, researchers may investigate and compare the
development of putative facets of mindfulness with mind-
fulness meditation practice in different traditions, including
secular practices such as taught in MBSR. This may con-
tribute to determining the aspects of the mindfulness con-
struct that are commonly enhanced among different
mindfulness meditation practices. Moreover, empirical re-
search may generally profit from a phenomenological ap-
proach, which allows a more detailed account of individual
experiences related to mindfulness and meditation.
The second issue concerns the extent to which mindful-
ness can be subdivided into meaningful, distinct facets.
Results based on the FMI, CAMS-R, and SMQ suggest
that mindfulness is intrinsically holistic with tightly
interconnected aspects (Leary and Tate 2007; Walach et al.
2006). Alternatively, validation studies of the KIMS,
FFMQ, TMS, and PHLMS support that mindfulness may
be conceptualized and assessed by distinct (and stable)
facets (Baer et al. 2004, 2006; Cardaciotto et al. 2008; Lau
et al. 2006). An important point needs to be resolved in this
respect: do such results depend on the nature of mindful-
ness, or rather on theoretical assumptions and methodolog-
ical artifacts specific to each questionnaire? The KIMS
items, for instance, were formulated based on a clear four-
factor conceptualization of mindfulness (Baer et al. 2004),
which may have had a decisive influence on the factor-
analytical confirmation of the expected structure. Interest-
ingly, in a cross-cultural study, the clear-cut KIMS factor
structure reported by Baer et al. (2004) could not be repli-
cated in both an American and a Thai sample (Christopher et
al. 2009). Further studies comparing the structure of
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mindfulness scales between samples varying in degree of
meditation experience, cultural background, gender, and age
are needed. Such studies could shed light on the (in)stability
of putative factor structures of scales and thus provide
evidence for or against the conceptualization and measure-
ment of mindfulness as comprising clearly distinct facets.
The third major challenge concerns whether self-report
measures are a valid assessment of mindfulness (Brown et
al. 2007; Christopher et al. 2009; Grossman 2008, 2011;
Van Dam et al. 2009), i.e., if they provide an accurate and
consistent measurement. As mentioned previously, several
studies have supported the validity of current mindfulness
scales, including expected associations with other constructs
(convergent and discriminant validity) as well as with med-
itation experience (known-groups validity) (Baer et al.
2009). The MAAS was also found to predict outcomes that
are consistent with mindfulness theory (predictive validity)
(Michalak et al. 2008). However, several authors point to a
range of problems specific to the assessment of mindfulness
(Christopher et al. 2009; Grossman 2008, 2011; Grossman
and van Dam 2011; Van Dam et al. 2009). Grossman (2011)
mentions ten putatively intractable problems. Some of these
(e.g., substantial divergence in the operationalizations of
mindfulness, content validity, the complexity and richness
of mindfulness, and the possibility to measure the construct
relying exclusively on negatively formulated items as in the
MAAS) were already discussed above. A number of the
issues raised by Grossman challenge the validity of current
mindfulness scales and should carefully be dealt with: Are
people’s ratings of their own mindfulness biased by desires
or valuations due to the personal meaningfulness of items?
Does the understanding of mindfulness items vary across
different populations? The first question deals with an issue
affecting self-report assessment in general such as bias due
to social desirability and personal values. Evidence dealing
with this issue in mindfulness assessment is still scarce and
inconsistent. For example, social desirability was found
to be positively correlated with the MAAS (Brown and
Ryan 2003) but negatively correlated with the PHLMS
(Cardaciotto et al. 2008). Moreover, the results were not
consistent over different social desirability scales as well
as over different populations (Brown and Ryan 2003;
Cardaciotto et al. 2008). This question, although pointing
to an important issue, generally applies to self-report assess-
ment, and it may not be specifically relevant for mindfulness.
Some unexpected results, however, suggest that a valid self-
report assessment of mindfulness may be hampered by signif-
icant differences in how scale items are understood semanti-
cally (Grossman 2008, 2011). Several findings pointed to such
differences: in a student sample, binge drinking and smoking
students scored higher on the FMI than matched control
students (Leigh et al. 2005); positive associations of the
FFMQ observe scale with measures of psychological
disorders in people without meditation experience, but
not in experienced meditators, likewise suggested an
idiosyncratic understanding of certain items (Baer et al.
2006). A qualitative study by Belzer et al. (2011) in-
volving the FMI could confirm the unstable interpreta-
tion of some items. The ambiguity of words that are
typically used in mindfulness items such as “awareness”,
“to notice”, “to judge” or “experience” may be the reason
for the differences in the understanding of items (Belzer et
al. 2011; Grossman 2008). Moreover, Grossman (2011)
suggested that a certain degree of mindfulness may be a
prerequisite for identifying own states of mindfulness
(resp. mindlessness), and thus for meaningfully respond-
ing to mindfulness items. Nevertheless, mindfulness has
also been described as an inherent human capacity that
occurs naturally and is not culturally bound (Brown and
Ryan 2004; Goldstein 2002; Kabat-Zinn 2003). As such,
it is experienced by all individuals and hence should be
measurable in individuals unacquainted with Buddhist
psychology. In our view, a general rejection of the validity
of self-report scales in the measurement of mindfulness (as
advocated by Grossman 2008) seems a rather extreme re-
sponse to this challenge. In fact, current criticisms of self-
report measures are based up on data derived from the cur-
rently available measures and are thus influenced by the
limitations of these scales.
The weaknesses of current mindfulness scales can serve
to improve the operationalization of the concept in the
future. Therefore, it may be misleading to generalize from
the current state of research and conclude that mindfulness
in principle cannot be assessed using self-report scales.
The challenge for the construction of self-report measures
of mindfulness may thus lie with constructing semantically
clear and unambiguous items, e.g., by formulating less
abstract items. This fundamental issue should be addressed
in future studies. Further qualitative examinations, evaluat-
ing item understanding in participants with different medi-
tation experience, age, culture, or gender may considerably
contribute to the compilation of items that are uniformly
interpreted across different groups. Such studies may also
point to aspects of mindfulness that cannot be meaningfully
self-evaluated by individuals who lack a certain degree of
mindfulness. Uniform understanding of items across groups
should also be addressed in quantitative studies by means of
differential item functioning analyses (Walker 2011).
Finally, it should be noted that the act of responding to a
mindfulness questionnaire itself may exert a positive influ-
ence on the development of mindfulness. In fact, the process
of self-monitoring and self-reporting alone can produce
desirable behavior change (Korotitsch and Nelson-Gray
1999), and this effect may be deliberately employed in
mindfulness-based interventions. To our knowledge, no
study has yet dealt with this putative effect but several
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observations speak for its plausibility. Favorable effects may
for example result from the fact that the act of responding to
questionnaire items may remind participants of their inten-
tion to develop mindfulness. Moreover, the items may pro-
vide a trigger for reflecting on which kind of experiences or
emotional states facilitate or hinder keeping a mindful atti-
tude through the day. Feedback from participants involved
in studies we are currently conducting appear to confirm that
such favorable effects occur when mindfulness is assessed
through self-report.
Conclusion
During past decades, several self-report measures of mind-
fulness have been validated and are currently used in re-
search. Each of the scales offers unique advantages and
disadvantages. Together they provide an interesting palette
of instruments allowing the assessment of trait and state
mindfulness in populations with differing degrees of famil-
iarity with mindfulness meditation, covering a broad spec-
trum of aspects of mindfulness. Yet, several findings have
pointed to weaknesses of current scales, particularly with
regard to the ambiguous interpretations of some items of
these scales. Moreover, there is still a lack of consensus with
regard to which aspects of mindfulness should be included
in a scale and to the kind of relationships existing between
them. Further studies, as well as new assessment instru-
ments addressing these issues, are thus encouraged. The
present overview suggested how problematic issues may
be addressed. Moreover, future studies may profit from the
growing literature based on previous operationalization
attempts. In general, given the increased importance of the
mindfulness concept and its widespread application in var-
ious clinical and health-related fields, the assessment of
mindfulness should be put on a more solid theoretical and
methodological basis.
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